Rational Survivability

A Shout Out to My Boy Grant Bourzikas...It's How We Roll...

I was reading Jeremiah Grossman's review of Fortify's film "The New Face of Cybercrime" (watch the trailer here) and noted this little passage in his review:

Then in a bold move, Roger Thorton (CTO of Fortify) and director Fredric Golding (with the 3 other panelists), opened things up to the audience to comment and ask questions. Right when they did that I was thinking to myself, OMG, these guys are crazy asking an infosec what they thought! To their credit they were very patient and professional in dealing with the many inane “constructive” criticisms voiced.

The stand out of the panelists was Grant Bourzikas, CISO of Scottrade, who was able to answer pointed question masterfully from “business” interest perspective. Clearly he has been around the block once or twice when it comes to web application security in the real world.

I was thrilled that Jeremiah pointed Grant out.  See, G. was one of my biggest enterprise customers at Crossbeam and I can tell you that he and the rest of the Scottrade security team know their stuff.  They have an incredible service architecture with one of the most robust security strategies you've seen in a business that lives and dies by the uptime SLAs they keep; availability is a function of security and Grant and his team do a phenomenal job maintaining both.

I can personally attest to the fact that he's been around the block more than a couple of times ;)  It's very, very cool to see someone like Jeremiah recognize someone like Grant -- since I know both of them it's a double-whammy for me because of how much respect I have for each of them.

Wow.  This got a little mushy, huh?  I guess I just miss him and his bobble-head doll (inside joke, sorry Evan.)

My only question is how did Grant manage to escape St. Louis?

/Hoff

Thin Clients: Does This Laptop Make My Ass(ets) Look Fat?

Juicy Fat Assets, Ripe For the Picking...

So here's an interesting spin on de/re-perimeterization...if people think we cannot achieve and cannot afford to wait for secure operating systems, secure protocols and self-defending information-centric environments but need to "secure" their environments today, I have a simple question supported by a simple equation for illustration:

For the majority of mobile and internal users in a typical corporation who use the basic set of applications:

1. Assume a company that:
   ...fits within the 90% of those who still have data centers, isn't completely outsourced/off-shored for IT and supports a remote workforce that uses Microsoft OS and the usual suspect applications and doesn't plan on utilizing distributed grid computing and widespread third-party SaaS
2. Take the following:
   Data Breaches.  Lost Laptops.  Non-sanitized corporate hard drives on eBay.  Malware.  Non-compliant asset configurations.  Patching woes.  Hardware failures.  Device Failure.  Remote Backup issues.  Endpoint Security Software Sprawl.  Skyrocketing security/compliance costs.  Lost Customer Confidence.  Fines.  Lost Revenue.  Reduced budget.
   
3. Combine With:
   Cheap Bandwidth.  Lots of types of bandwidth/access modalities.  Centralized Applications and Data. Any Web-enabled Computing Platform.  SSL VPN.  Virtualization.  Centralized Encryption at Rest.  IAM.  DLP/CMP.  Lots of choices to provide thin-client/streaming desktop capability.  Offline-capable Web Apps.
4. Shake Well, Re-allocate Funding, Streamline Operations and "Security"...
5. You Get:
   Less Risk.  Less Cost.  Better Control Over Data.  More "Secure" Operations.  Better Resilience.  Assurance of Information.  Simplified Operations. Easier Backup.  One Version of the Truth (data.)

---

I really just don't get why we continue to deploy and are forced to support remote platforms we can't protect, allow our data to inhabit islands we can't control and at the same time admit the inevitability of disaster while continuing to spend our money on solutions that can't possibly solve the problems.

If we're going to be information centric, we should take the first rational and reasonable steps toward doing so. Until the operating systems are more secure, the data can self-describe and cause the compute and network stacks to "self-defend," why do we continue to focus on the endpoint which is a waste of time.

If we can isolate and reduce the number of avenues of access to data and leverage dumb presentation platforms to do it, why aren't we?

...I mean besides the fact that an entire industry has been leeching off this mess for decades...

---

I'll Gladly Pay You Tuesday For A Secure Solution Today...

The technology exists TODAY to centralize the bulk of our most important assets and allow our workforce to accomplish their goals and the business to function just as well (perhaps better) without the need for data to actually "leave" the data centers in whose security we have already invested so much money.

Many people are doing that with the servers already with the adoption of virtualization.  Now they need to do with their clients.

The only reason we're now going absolutely stupid and spending money on securing endpoints in their current state is because we're CAUSING (not just allowing) data to leave our enclaves.  In fact with all this blabla2.0 hype, we've convinced ourselves we must.

Hogwash.  I've posted on the consumerization of IT where companies are allowing their employees to use their own compute platforms.  How do you think many of them do this?

Relax, Dude...Keep Your Firewalls...

In the case of centralized computing and streamed desktops to dumb/thin clients, the "perimeter" still includes our data centers and security castles/moats, but also encapsulates a streamed, virtualized, encrypted, and authenticated thin-client session bubble.  Instead of worrying about the endpoint, it's nothing more than a flickering display with a keyboard/mouse.

Let your kid use Limewire.  Let Uncle Bob surf pr0n.  Let wifey download spyware.  If my data and applications don't live on the machine and all the clicks/mouseys are just screen updates, what do I care?

Yup, you can still use a screen scraper or a camera phone to use data inappropriately, but this is where balancing risk comes into play.  Let's keep the discussion within the 80% of reasonable factored arguments.  We'll never eliminate 100% and we don't have to in order to be successful.

Sure, there are exceptions and corner cases where data *does* need to leave our embrace, but we can eliminate an entire class of problem if we take advantage of what we have today and stop this endpoint madness.

This goes for internal corporate users who are chained to their desks and not just mobile users.

What's preventing you from doing this today?

/Hoff

2008 Security Predictions -- They're Like Elbows...

Yup.  Security predictions are like elbows.  Most everyone's got at least two, they're usually ignored unless rubbed the wrong way but when used appropriately, can be devastating in a cage match...

So, in the spirit of, well, keeping up with the Jones', I happily present you with Hoff's 2008 Information (in)Security Predictions.  Most of them are feature attacks/attack vectors.  A couple are ooh-aah trends.  Most of them are sadly predictable.  I've tried to be more specific than "cybercrime will increase."

I'm really loathe do these, but being a futurist, the only comfort I can take is that nobody can tell me that I'm wrong today ;)

...and in the words of Carnac the Magnificent, "May the winds of the Sahara blow a desert scorpion up your turban..."

1. Nasty Virtualization Hypervisor Compromise
   As the Hypervisor gets thinner, more of the guts will need to be exposed via API or shed to management and functionality-extending toolsets, expanding the attack surface with new vulnerabilities.  To wit, a Hypervisor-compromising malware will make it's first in-the-wild appearance to not only produce an exploit, but obfuscate itself thanks to the magic of virtualization in the underlying chipsets.  Hang on to yer britches, the security vendor product marketing SpecOps Generals are going to scramble the fighters with a shock and awe campaign of epic "I told you so" & "AV isn't dead, it's just virtualized" proportions...Security "strategery" at it's finest.
   
   
2. Major Privacy Breach of a Social Networking Site
   With the broadening reach of application extensibility and Web2.0 functionality, we'll see a major privacy breach via social network sites such as MySpace, LinkedIn or Facebook via the usual suspects (CSRF, XSS, etc.) and via host-based Malware that 0wns unsuspecting Millenials and utilizes the interconnectivity offered to turn these services into a "social botnet" platform with a wrath the likes of which only the ungoldly lovechild of Storm, Melissa, and Slammer could bring...
   
   
3. Integrity Hack of a Major SaaS Vendor
   Expect a serious bit of sliminess to occur with real financial impact to occur from a SaaS vendor's offering.  With professional cybercrime on the rise, the criminals will go not only where the money is, but also after the data that describes where that money is.  Since much of the security of the SaaS model counts on the integrity and not just the availability of the hosted service, a targeted attack which holds hostage the (non-portable) data and threatens its integrity could have devastating effects on the companies who rely on it.  SalesForce, anyone?
    
4. Targeted eBanking Compromise with substantial financial losses
   Get ready for a nasty eBanking focused compromise that starts to unravel the consumer confidence in this convenient utility; not directly because of identity abuse (note I didn't say identity theft) but because of the business model impact it will bring to the banks.   These types of direct attacks (beyond phishing) will start to push the limits of acceptable loss for the financial institutions and their insurers and will start to move the accountability/responsibility more heavily down to the eBanker.  A tiered service level will surface with greater functionality/higher transaction limits being offered with a trade-off of higher security/less convenience.  Same goes for credit/debit cards...priceless!
   
   
5. A Major state-sponsored espionage and cyberAttack w/disruption of U.S. government function
   We saw some of the more noisy examples of low-level crack attacks via our Chinese friends recently, but given the proliferation of botnets, the inexcusably poor levels of security in government systems and network security, we'll see a targeted attack against something significant.  It'll be big.  It'll be public.  It'll bring new legislation...Isn't there some little election happening soon?  This brings us to...
   
   
6. Be-Afraid-A of a SCADA compromise...the lunatics are running the asylum!
   Remember that leaked DHS "turn your generator into a roman candle" video that circulated a couple of months ago?  Get ready to see the real thing on prime time news at 11.  We've got decades of legacy controls just waiting for the wrong guy to flip the right switch.  We just saw an "insider" of a major water utility do naughty things, imagine if someone really motivated popped some goofy pills and started playing Tetris with the power grid...imagine what all those little SCADA doodads are hooked to...
    
7. A Major Global Service/Logistics/Transportation/Shipping/Supply-Chain Company will be compromised via targeted attack
   A service we take for granted like UPS, FedEx, or DHL will have their core supply chain/logistics systems interrupted causing the fragile underbelly of our global economic interconnectedness to show itself, warts and all.  Prepare for huge chargebacks on next day delivery when all those mofo's don't get their self-propelled, remote-controlled flying UFO's delivered from Amazon.com.
   
   
8. Mobile network attacks targeting mobile broadband
   So, you don't use WiFi because it's insecure, eh?  Instead, you fire up that Verizon EVDO card plugged into your laptop or tether to your mobile phone instead because it's "secure."  Well, that's going to be a problem next year.  Expect to see compromise of the RF you hold so dear as we all scramble to find that next piece of spectrum that has yet to be 0wn3d...Google's 700Mhz spectrum, you say? Oh, wait...WiMax will save us all...
    
9. My .txt file just 0wn3d me!  Is nothing sacred!?  Common file formats and protocols to cause continued unnatural acts
   PDF's, Quicktime, .PPT, .DOC, .XLS.  If you can't trust the sanctity of the file formats and protocols from Adobe, Apple and Microsoft, who can you trust!?  Expect to see more and more abuse of generic underlying software plumbing providing the conduit for exploit.  Vulnerabilities that aren't fixed properly combined with a dependence on OS security functionality that's only half baked is going to mean that the "Burros Gone Wild" video you're watching on YouTube is going to make you itchy in more ways than one...

---

10. Converged SensorNets
    In places like the UK, we've seen the massive deployment of CCTV monitoring of the populous.  In places like South Central L.A., we have ballistic geo-location and detection systems to track gunshots.  We've got GPS in phones.  In airports we have sniffers, RFID passport processing, biometrics and "Total Recall" nudie scanners.  The PoPo have license plate recognition.  Vegas has facial recognition systems.  Our borders have motion, heat and remote sensing pods.  start knitting this all together and you have massive SensorNets -- all networked -- and able to track you to military precision.  Pair that with GoogleMaps/Streets and I'll be able to tell what color underwear you had on at the Checkout counter of your local Qwik-E-Mart when you bought that mocha slurpaccino last Tuesday...please don't ask me how I know.
    
    
11. Information Centric Security Phase One
    It should come as no surprise that focusing our efforts on the host and the network has led to the spectacular septic tank of security we have today.  We need to focus on content in context and set policies across platform and transport to dictate who, how, when, where, and why the creation, modification, consumption and destruction of data should occur.  In this first generation of DLP/CMF solutions (which are being integrated into the larger base of "Information" centric "assurance" solutions,) we've taken the first step along this journey.  What we'll begin to see in 2008 is the information equivalent of the Mission Impossible self-destructing recording...only with a little more intelligence and less smoke.  Here come the DRM haters...
     
12. The Attempted Coup to Return to Centralized Computing with the Paradox of Distributed Data
    Despite the fact that data is being distributed to the far reaches of the Universe, the wonders of economics combined with the utility of some well-timed technology is seeing IT & Security (encouraged by the bean counters) attempting to reel the genie back in the bottle and re-centralize the computing (desktop, server, application and storage) experience back into big boxes tucked safely away in some data center somewhere.  Funny thing is, with utility/grid computing and SaaS, the data center is but an abstraction, too.  Virtualization companies will become our dark overlords as they will control the very fabric of our digital lives...2008 is when we'll really start to use the web as the platform for the delivery of all applications, served through streamed desktops on thinner and thinner clients.

So, that's all I could come up with.  I don't really have a formulaic empirical model like Stiennon.  I just have a Guiness and start complaining.  This is what I came up with.

In more ways than one, I hope I'm terribly wrong on most of these.

/Hoff

[Edit: Please see my follow-on post titled "And Now Some Useful 2008 Information Survivability Predictions" which speak to some interesting less gloomy things I predict to happen in 2008]

On-Demand SaaS Vendors Able to Secure Assets Better than Customers?

I'm a big advocate of software as a service (SaaS) -- have been for years.  This evangelism started for me almost 5 years ago when I become a Qualys MSSP customer listening to Philippe Courtot espouse the benefits of SaaS for vulnerability management.  This was an opportunity to allow me to more efficiently, effectively and cheaply manage my VA problem.  They demonstrated how they were good custodians of the data (my data) that they housed and how I could expect they would protect it.

I did not, however, feel *more* secure because they housed my VA data.  I felt secure enough that how they housed it should not fall into the wrong hands.  It's called an assessment of risk and exposure.  I performed it and was satisfied it matched my company's appetite and business requirements.

Not one to appear unclear on where I stand, I maintain that the SaaS can bring utility, efficiency, cost effectiveness, enhanced capabilities and improved service levels to a corporation depending upon who, what, why, how, where and when the service is deployed.  Sometimes it can bring a higher level of security to an organization, but so can an armed squadron of pissed off armed Oompa Loompa's -- it's all a matter of perspective.

I suggest that attempting to qualify the benefits of SaaS by generalizing in any sense is, well, generally a risky thing to do.  It often turns what could be a valid point of interest into a point of contention.

Such is the case with a story I read in a UK edition of IT Week by Phil Muncaster titled "On Demand Security Issues Raised."  In this story, the author describes the methods in which the security posture of SaaS vendors may be measured, comparing the value, capabilities and capacity of the various options and the venue for evaluating an SaaS MSSP:  hire an external contractor or rely on the MSSP to furnish you the results of an internally generated assessment.

I think this is actually a very useful and valid discussion to have -- whom to trust and why?  In many cases, these vendors house sensitive and sometimes confidential data regarding an enterprise, so security is paramount.  One would suggest that anyone looking to engage an MSSP of any sort, especially one offering a critical SaaS, would perform due diligence in one form or another before signing on the dotted line.

That's not really what I wanted to discuss, however.

What I *did* want to address was the comment in the article coming from Andy Kellett, an analyst for Burton, that read thusly:

"Security is probably less a problem than in the end-user organisations because [on-demand app providers] are measured by the service they provide," Kellett argued.

I *think* I probably understand what he's saying here...that security is "less of a problem" for an MSSP because the pressures of the implied penalties associated with violating an SLA are so much more motivating to get security "right" that they can do it far more effectively, efficiently and better than a customer.

This is a selling point, I suppose?  Do you, dear reader, agree?  Does the implication of outsourcing security actually mean that you "feel" or can prove that you're more secure or better secured than you could do yourself by using a SaaS MSSP?

"I don't agree the end-user organisation's pen tester of choice should be doing the testing. The service provider should do it and make that information available."

Um, why?  I can understand not wanting hundreds of scans against my service in an unscheduled way, but what do you have to hide?  You want me to *trust* you that you're more secure or holding up your end of the bargain?  Um, no thanks.  It's clear that this person has never seen the results of an internally generated PenTest and how real threats can be rationalized away into nothingness...

Clarence So of Salesforce.com agreed, adding that most chief information officers today understand that software-as-a-service (SaaS) vendors are able to secure data more effectively than they can themselves.

Really!?  It's not just that they gave into budget pressures, agreed to transfer the risk and reduce OpEx and CapEx?  Care to generalize more thoroughly, Clarence?  Can you reference proof points for me here?  My last company used Salesforce.com, but as the person who inherited the relationship, I can tell you that I didn't feel at all more "secure" because SF was hosting my data.  In fact, I felt more exposed.

"I'm sure training companies have their own motives for advocating the need for in-house skills such as penetration testing," he argued. "But any suggestions the SaaS model is less secure than client-server software are well wide of the mark."

...and any suggestion that they are *more* secure is pure horsecock marketing at its finest.  Prove it.  And please don't send me your SAS-70 report as your example of security fu.

So just to be clear, I believe in SaaS.  I encourage its use if it makes good business sense.  I don't, however, agree that you will automagically be *more* secure.  You maybe just *as* secure, but it should be more cost-effective to deploy and manage.  There may very well be cases (I can even think of some) where one could be more or less secure, but I'm not into generalizations.

Whaddya think?

/Hoff

Secure Services in the Cloud (SSaaS/Web2.0) - InternetOS Service Layers

The last few days of activity involving Google and Microsoft have really catalyzed some thinking and demonstrated some very intriguing indicators as to how the delivery of applications and services is dramatically evolving. 

I don't mean the warm and fuzzy marketing fluff.  I mean some real anchor technology investments by the big-boys putting their respective stakes in the ground as they invest hugely in redefining their business models to setup for the future.

Enterprises large and small are really starting to pay attention to the difference between infrastructure and architecture and this has a dramatic effect on the service providers and supply chain who interact with them.

It's become quite obvious that there is huge business value associated with divorcing the need for "IT" to focus on physically instantiating and locating "applications" on "boxes" and instead  delivering "services" with the Internet/network as the virtualized delivery mechanism.

Google v. Microsoft - Let's Get Ready to Rumble!

My last few posts on Google's move to securely deliver a variety of applications and services represents the uplift of the "traditional" perspective of backoffice SaaS offerings such as Salesforce.com but also highlights the migration of desktop applications and utility services to the "cloud" also.

This is really executing on the vision of the thin-client Internet-centric vision from back in the day o' the bubble when we saw a ton of Internet-borne services such as storage, backup, etc.  using the "InternetOS" as the canvas for service.

So we've talked about Google.  I maintain that their strategy is to ultimately take on Microsoft -- including backoffice, utility and desktop applications.  So let's look @ what the kids from Redmond are up to.

What Microsoft is developing towards with their vision of CloudOS was just recently expounded upon by one Mr. Ballmer.

Not wanting to lose mindshare or share of wallet, Microsoft is maneuvering to give the customer control over how they want to use applications and more importantly how they might be delivered.  Microsoft Live bridges the gap between the traditional desktop and puts that capability into the "cloud."

Let's explore that a little:

In addition to making available its existing services, such as mail and instant messaging, Microsoft also will create core infrastructure services, such as storage and alerts, that developers can build on top of. It's a set of capabilities that have been referred to as a "Cloud OS," though it's not a term Microsoft likes to use publicly.

...

Late last month, Microsoft introduced two new Windows Live Services, one for sharing photos and the other for all types of files. While those services are being offered directly by Microsoft today, they represent the kinds of things that Microsoft is now promising will be also made available to developers.

Among the other application and infrastructure components, Microsoft plans to open are its systems for alerts, contact management, communications (mail and messenger) and authentication.

...

As it works to build out the underlying core services, Microsoft is also offering up applications to partners, such as Windows Live Hotmail, Windows Live Messenger and the Spaces blogging tool.

Combine the emerging advent of "thinner" end-points (read: mobility products) with high-speed, lower latency connectivity and we can see why this model is attractive and viable.  I think this battle is heating up and the consumer will benefit.

A Practical Example of SaaS/InternetOS Today?

So if we take a step back from Google and Microsoft for a minute, let's take a snapshot of how one might compose, provision, and deploy applications and data as a service using a similar model over the Internet with tools other than Live or GoogleGear.

Let me give you a real-world example -- deliverable today -- of this capability with a functional articulation of this strategy; on-demand services and applications provided via virtualized datacenter delivery architectures using the Internet as the transport.  I'm going to use a mashup of two technologies: Yahoo Pipes and 3tera's AppLogic.

Yahoo Pipes is  "...an interactive data aggregator and manipulator that lets you mashup your favorite online data sources."  Assuming you have data from various sources you want to present an application environment such as Pipes will allow you to dynamically access, transform and present this information any way you see fit.

This means that you can create what amounts to application and services on demand. 

Let's agree however that while you have the data integration/presentation layer, in many cases you would traditionally require a complex collection of infrastructure from which this source data is housed, accessed, maintained and secured. 

However, rather than worry about where and how the infrastructure is physically located, let's use the notion of utility/grid computing to make available dynamically an on-demand architecture that is modular, reusable and flexible to make my service delivery a reality -- using the Internet as a transport.

Enter 3Tera's AppLogic:

3Tera's AppLogic is used by hosting providers to offer true utility computing. You get all the control of having your own virtual datacenter, but without the need to operate a single server.

Deploy and operate applications in your own virtual private datacenter

Set up infrastructure, deploy apps and manage operations with just a browser    
Scale from a fraction of a server to hundreds of servers in days

Deploy and run any Linux software without modifications

Get your life back: no more late night rushes to replace failed equipment

In fact, BT is using them as part of the 21CN project which I've written about many times before.

So check out this vision, assuming the InternetOS as a transport.  It's the drag-and-drop, point-and-click Metaverse of virtualized application and data combined with on-demand infrastructure.

You first define the logical service composition and provisioning through 3Tera with a visual drag-drop canvas, defining firewalls, load-balancers, switches, web servers, app. servers, databases, etc.  Then you click the "Go" button.  AppLogic provisions the entire thing for you without you even necessarily knowing where these assets are.

Then, use something like Pipes to articulate how data sources can be accessed, consumed and transformed to deliver the requisite results.  All over the Internet, transparent to you securely.

Very cool stuff.

Here are some screen-caps of Pipes and 3Tera.

 

 

 

Take5- Five Questions for Chris Wysopal, CTO Veracode

In this first installment of Take5, I interview Chris Wysopal, the CTO of Veracode about his new company, secure coding, vulnerability research and the recent forays into application security by IBM and HP.

This entire interview was actually piped over a point-to-point TCP/IP connection using command-line redirection through netcat.  No packets were harmed during the making of this interview...

First, a little background on the victim, Chris Wysopal:

Chris Wysopal is co-founder and CTO of Veracode. He has testified on Capitol Hill on the subjects of government computer security and how vulnerabilities are discovered in software. Chris co-authored the password auditing tool L0phtCrack, wrote the windows version of netcat, and was a researcher at the security think tank, L0pht Heavy Industries, which was acquired by @stake. He was VP of R&D at @stake and later director of development at Symantec, where he led a team developing binary static analysis technology.

He was influential in the creation of responsible vulnerability disclosure guidelines and a founder of the Organization for Internet Safety.  Chris wrote "The Art of Software Security Testing: Identifying Security Flaws", published by Addison Wesley and Symantec Press in December 2006. He earned his Bachelor of Science degree in Computer and Systems Engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

1) You’re a founder of Veracode which is described as the industry’s first provider
of automated, on-demand application security solutions.  What sort of application
security services does Veracode provide?  Binary analysis, Web Apps?
 

Veracode currently offers binary static analysis of C/C++ applications for Windows and Solaris and for Java applications.  This allows us to find the classes of vulnerabilities that source code analysis tools can find but on the entire codebase including the libraries which you probably don't have source code for. Our product roadmap includes support for C/C++ on Linux and C# on .Net.  We will also be adding additional analysis techniques to our flagship binary static analysis.

 
2) Is this a SaaS model? How do you charge for your services?  Do you see manufacturers
using your services or enterprises?
 

Yes. Customers upload their binaries to us and we deliver an analysis of their security flaws via our web portal.  We charge by the megabyte of code.  We have both software vendors and enterprises who write or outsource their own custom software using our services.  We also have enterprises who are purchasing software ask the software vendors to submit their binaries to us for a 3rd party analysis.  They use this analysis as a factor in their purchasing decision. It can lead to a "go/no go" decision, a promise by the vendor to remediate the issues found, or a reduction in price to compensate for the cost of additional controls or the cost of incident response that insecure software necessitates.

 
3) I was a Qualys customer — a VA/VM SaaS company.  Qualys had to spend quite
a bit of time convincing customers that allowing for the storage of their VA data was
secure.  How does Veracode address a customer’s security concerns when uploading their
applications?

We are absolutely fanatical about the security of our customers data.  I look back at the days when I was a security consultant where we had vulnerability data on laptops and corporate file shares and I say, "what were we thinking?"  All customer data at Veracode is encrypted in storage and at rest with a unique key per application and customer.  Everyone at Veracode uses 2 factor authentication to log in and 2 factor is the default for customers.  Our data center is a SAS 70 Type II facility. All data access is logged so we know exactly who looked at what and when. As security people we are professionally paranoid and I think it shows through in the system we built.  We also believe in 3rd party verification so we have had a top security boutique do a security review our portal application.

 
4) With IBM’s acquisition of Watchfire and today’s announcement that HP will buy
SPI Dynamics, how does Veracode stand to play in this market of giants who will
be competing to drive service revenues?
 

We have designed our solution from the ground up to have the Web 2.0 ease of use and experience and we have the quality of analysis that I feel is the best in the market today.  An advantage is Veracode is an independent assessment company that customers can trust to not play favorites to other software companies because of partnerships or alliances. Would Moody's or Consumer Reports be trusted as a 3rd party if they were part of a big financial or technology conglomerate? We feel a 3rd party assessment is important in the security world.

 
5) Do you see the latest developments in vulnerability research with the drive for
pay-for-zeroday initiatives pressuring developers to produce secure code out of the box
for fear of exploit or is it driving the activity to companies like yours?
 

I think the real driver for developers to produce secure code and for developers and customers to seek code assessments is the reality that the costs of insecure code goes up everyday and its adding to the operational risk of companies that use software.  People exploiting vulnerabilities are not going away and there is no way to police the internet of vulnerability information.  The only solution is for customers to demand more secure code, and proof of it, and for developers to deliver more secure code in response.

Bye Bye, SPI (Dynamics...)

I think this one has been forecasted about eleventy-billion times already, but HP is acquiring SPI Dynamics.

I think it's clear why, and HP, just like IBM, are going to use this to drive service revenue.  I wonder when HP's acqusition of an MSSP will take place to compete with BT's efforts with Counterpane & INS, etc.?

Well, that leaves only 600+ security companies left in the security consolidation dating pool...

/Hoff

Breaking News: SOA, Web services security hinge on XML gateways!

Bloody Hell!

The article below is dated today, but perhaps this was just the TechTarget AutoBlogCronPoster gone awry from 2004? 

Besides the fact that this revelation garners another vote for the RationalSecurity "Captain Obvious" (see right) award, the simple fact that XML gateways as a stand-alone market are being highlighted here is laughable -- especially since the article clearly shows the XML Security Gateways are being consolidated and bundled with application delivery controllers and WAF solutions by vendors such as IBM and Cisco.

XML is, and will be everywhere.  SOA/Web Services is only one element in a greater ecosystem impacted by XML.

Of course the functionality provided by XML security gateways are critical to the secure deployment of SOA environments; they should be considered table stakes, just like secure coding...but of course we know how consistently-applied compensating controls are painted onto network and application architectures. 

The dirty little secret is that while they are very useful and ultimately an excellent tool in the arsenal, these solutions are disruptive, difficult to configure and maintain, performance pigs and add complexity to an already complex model.  In many cases, asking a security team to manage this sort of problem introduces more operational risk than it mitigates. 

Can you imagine security, network and developers actually having to talk to one another?!  *gasp*

Here is the link to the entire story.  I've snipped pieces out for relevant mockery.

ORLANDO, Fla. -- Enterprises are moving forward with service oriented architecture (SOA) projects to reduce complexity and increase flexibility between systems and applications, but some security pros fear they're being left behind and must scramble to learn new ways to protect those systems from Web-based attacks.

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"Most network firewalls aren't designed to handle the latest Web services standards, resulting in new avenues of attack for digital miscreants, said Tim Bond, a senior security engineer at webMethods Inc. In his presentation at the Infosec World Conference and Expo, Bond said a growing number of vendors are selling XML security gateways, appliances that can be plugged into a network and act as an intermediary, decrypting and encrypting Web services data to determine the authenticity and lock out attackers.

"It's not just passing a message through, it's actually taking action," Bond said. "It needs to be customized for each deployment, but it can be very effective in protecting from many attacks."

Bond said that most SOA layouts further expose applications by placing them just behind an outer layer of defense, rather than placing them within the inner walls of a company's security defenses along with other critical applications and systems. Those applications are vulnerable, because they're being exposed to partners, customer relationship management and supply chain management systems. Attackers can scan Web services description language (WSDL) -- the XML language used in Web service calls -- to find out where vulnerabilities lie, Bond said.

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A whole market has grown around protecting WSDL, Bond said. Canada-based Layer 7 Technologies Inc. and UK-based Vordel are producing gateway appliances to protect XML and SOAP language in Web service calls. Reactivity, which was recently acquired by Cisco Systems Inc. and DataPower, now a division of IBM, also address Web services security.

Transaction values will be much higher and traditional SSL, security communications protocol for point-to-point communications, won't be enough to protect transactions, Bond said.

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In addition to SQL-injection attacks, XML is potentially vulnerable to schema poisoning -- a method of attack in which the XML schema can be manipulated to alter processing information. A sophisticated attacker can also conduct an XML routing detour, redirecting sensitive data within the XML path, Bond said.

Security becomes complicated with distributed systems in an SOA environment, said Dindo Roberts, an application security manager at New York City-based MetLife Inc. Web services with active interfaces allow the usage of applications that were previously restricted to using conventional custom authentication. Security pros need new methods, such as an XML security gateway to protect those applications, Roberts said.

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